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Abstract
Most work in game theory assumes that players are perfect reasoners and have common knowl-
edge of all significant aspects of the game. In earlier work [Halpern and Reˆgo 2006], we proposed
a framework for representing and analyzing games with possibly unaware players, and suggested
a generalization of Nash equilibrium appropriate for games with unaware players that we called
generalized Nash equilibrium. Here, we use this framework to analyze other solution concepts that
have been considered in the game-theory literature, with a focus on sequential equilibrium. We also
provide some insight into the notion of generalized Nash equilibrium by proving that it is closely
related to the notion of rationalizability when we restrict the analysis to games in normal form and
no unawareness is involved.
Keywords: Economic Theory, Foundations of Game Theory, Awareness, Sequential Equilibrium,
Rationalizability.
1 INTRODUCTION
Game theory has proved to be a useful tool in the modeling and analysis of many phenomena involv-
ing interaction between multiple agents. However, standard models used in game theory implicitly
assume that agents are perfect reasoners and have common knowledge of all significant aspects of the
game. There are many situations where these assumptions are not reasonable. In large games, agents
may not be aware of the other players in the game or all the moves a player can make. Recently, we
[Halpern and Reˆgo 2006] proposed a way of modeling such games. A key feature of this approach is
the use of an augmented game, which represents what players are aware of at each node of an extensive
form representation of a game. Since the game is no longer assumed to be common knowledge, each
augmented game represents the game a player considers possible in some situation and describes how
he believes each other player’s awareness level changes over time, where intuitively the awareness level
of a player is the set of histories of the game that the player is aware of.
In games with possibly unaware players, standard solution concepts cannot be applied. For example,
in a standard game a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if each agent’s strategy is a best response
to the other agents’ strategies, so each agent i would continue playing his strategy even if i knew what
strategies the other agents were using. In the presence of unawareness this no longer make sense, since
the strategies used by other players may involve moves i is unaware of. We proposed a generalization
of Nash equilibrium consisting of a collection of strategies, one for each pair (i,Γ′), where Γ′ is a game
that agent i considers to be the true game in some situation. Intuitively, the strategy for a player i at Γ′
is the strategy i would play in situations where i believes that the true game is Γ′. Roughly speaking,
a generalized strategy profile ~σ, which includes a strategy σi,Γ′ for each pair (i,Γ′), is a generalized
Nash equilibrium if σi,Γ′ is a best response for player i if the true game is Γ′, given the strategies being
used by the other players in Γ′. We showed that every game with awareness has a generalized Nash
equilibrium by associating a game with awareness with a standard game (where agents are aware of all
moves) and proving that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the generalized Nash equilibria
of the game with awareness and the Nash equilibria of the standard game.
Some Nash equilibria seem unreasonable. For example, consider the game shown in Figure 1. One
Figure 1: A simple game.
Nash equilibrium of this game has A playing downA and B playing acrossB . In this equilibrium, B gets
a payoff of 3, and A get a relatively poor payoff of 1. Intuitively, A plays down because of B’s “threat”
to play acrossB . But this threat does not appear to be so credible. If player B is rational and ever gets
to move, he will not choose to move acrossB since it gives him a lower payoff than playing downB .
Moreover, if B will play downB if he gets to move, then A should play acrossA .
One standard interpretation of a Nash equilibrium is that a player chooses his strategy at the be-
ginning of the game, and then does not change it because he has no motivation for doing so (since his
payoff is no higher when he changes strategies). But this interpretation is suspect in extensive-form
games when a player makes a move that takes the game off the equilibrium path. It may seem unreason-
able for a player to then play the move called for by his strategy (even if the strategy is part of a Nash
equilibrium), as in the case of player B choosing acrossB in the example of Figure 1. In other words,
a threat to blow up the world if I catch you cheating in a game may be part of a Nash equilibrium, and
does not cause problems if in fact no one cheats, but it hardly seems credible if someone does cheat.
One way to justify the existence of incredible threats off the equilibrium path in a Nash equilibrium
is to view the player as choosing a computer program that will play the game for him, and then leaving.
Since the program is not changed once it is set in motion, threats about moves that will be made at
information sets off the equilibrium path become more credible. However, in a game with awareness, a
player cannot write a program to play the whole game at the beginning of the game because, when his
level of awareness changes, he realizes that there are moves available to him that he was not aware of
at the beginning of the game. He thus must write a new program that takes this into account. But this
means we cannot sidestep the problem of incredible threats by appealing to the use of a pre-programmed
computer to play a strategy. Once we allow a player to change his program, threats that were made
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credible because the program could not be rewritten become incredible again. Thus, the consideration
of equilibrium refinements that block incredible threats becomes even more pertinent with awareness.1
There have been a number of variants of Nash equilibrium proposed in the literature to deal with this
problem (and others), including perfect equilibrium [Selten 1975], proper equilibrium [Myerson 1978],
sequential equilibrium [Kreps and Wilson 1982], and rationalizability [Bernheim 1984; Pearce 1984],
to name just a few. Each of these solution concepts involves some notion of best response. Our frame-
work allows for straightforward generalizations of all these solution concepts. As in our treatment of
Nash equilibrium, if Γ1 6= Γ2, we treat player i who considers the true game to be Γ1 to be a different
agent from the version of player i who considers Γ2 to be the true game. Each version of player i best
responds (in the sense appropriate for that solution concept) given his view of the game. In standard
games, it has been shown that, in each game, there is a strategy profile satisfying that solution concept.
Showing that an analogous result holds in games with awareness can be nontrivial. Instead of going
through the process of generalizing every solution concept, we focus here on sequential equilibrium
since (a) it is one of the best-known solution concepts for extensive games, (b) the proof that a gen-
eralized sequential equilibrium exists suggests an interesting generalization of sequential equilibrium
for standard games, and (c) the techniques used to prove its existence in games with awareness may
generalize to other solution concepts.
Sequential equilibrium refines Nash equilibrium (in the sense that every sequential equilibrium is
a Nash equilibrium) and does not allow solutions such as (downA, acrossB ). Intuitively, in a sequen-
tial equilibrium, every player must make a best response at every information set (even if it is reached
with probability 0). In the game shown in Figure 1, the unique sequential equilibrium has A choosing
acrossA and B choosing downB . We propose a generalization of sequential equilibrium to games with
possibly unaware players, and show that every game with awareness has a generalized sequential equi-
librium. This turns out to be somewhat more subtle than the corresponding argument for generalized
Nash equilibrium. Our proof requires us to define a generalization of sequential equilibrium in standard
games. Roughly speaking, this generalization relaxes the implicit assumption in sequential equilibrium
that every history in an information set is actually considered possible by the player. We call this notion
conditional sequential equilibrium.
Other issues arise when considering sequential equilibrium in games with awareness. For example,
in a standard game, when a player reaches a history that is not on the equilibrium path, he must believe
that his opponent made a mistake. However, in games with awareness, a player may become aware of
her own unawareness and, as a result, switch strategies. In the definition of sequential equilibrium in
standard games, play off the equilibrium path is dealt with by viewing it as the limit of “small mistakes”
(i.e., small deviations from the equilibrium strategy). Given that there are alternative ways of dealing
with mistakes in games with awareness, perhaps other approaches for dealing with off-equilibrium play
might be more appropriate. While other ways of dealing with mistakes may well prove interesting,
we would argue that our generalization of sequential equilibrium can be motivated the same way as in
standard games. Roughly speaking, for us, how a player’s awareness level changes over time is not part
of the equilibrium concept, but is given as part of the description of the game.
We also provide some insight into the notion of generalized Nash equilibrium by proving that, in a
precise sense, it is closely related to the notion of rationalizability when we restrict the analysis to games
in normal form and no unawareness is involved (although the underlying game is no longer common
knowledge among the players). Roughly speaking, a normal form game can be thought as a one-shot
1We thank Aviad Heifetz and an anonymous referee for raising some of these issues.
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extensive game where no player knows the move the others made before they make their own move.
Intuitively, in standard games, a strategy is rationalizable for a player if it is a best response to some
reasonable beliefs he might have about the strategies being played by other players, and a strategy is
part of a Nash equilibrium if it is a best response to the strategies actually played by the other players.
Since, in games with awareness, the game is not common knowledge, a local strategy for player i in Γ+
is part of a generalized Nash equilibrium if it is a best response to the strategies played by the opponents
of player i in the games player i believes his opponents consider to be the actual one while moving in
Γ+. Note that the line between rationalizability and generalized Nash equilibrium is not sharp. In fact,
we are essentially able to prove that a strategy is rationalizable in a standard game Γ iff it is part of
generalized Nash equilibrium of an appropriate game with awareness whose underlying game is Γ.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the reader the necessary back-
ground to understand this paper by reviewing our model for games with awareness. In Section 3, we re-
view the definition of sequential equilibrium for standard games and define its generalization for games
with awareness. In Section 4, we define the concept of conditional sequential equilibrium for stan-
dard games, and prove that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the generalized sequential
equilibria of a game with awareness and the conditional sequential equilibria of the standard game asso-
ciated with it. In Section 5, we analyze the connection between rationalizability and generalized Nash
equilibrium. We conclude in Section 6. Proofs of the theorems can be found in the Appendix.
2 GAMES WITH AWARENESS
In this section, we introduce some notation and give some intuition regarding games with awareness.
We encourage the reader to consult our earlier paper for details.
Games with awareness are modeled using augmented games. Given a standard extensive-form game
described by a game tree Γ, an augmented game Γ+ based on Γ augments Γ by describing each agent’s
awareness level at each node, where player i’s awareness level at a node h is essentially the set of runs
(complete histories) in Γ that i is aware of at node h. A player’s awareness level may change over time,
as the player becomes aware of more moves.
Formally, a (finite) extensive game is a tuple Γ = (N,M,H,P, fc, {Ii : i ∈ N}, {ui : i ∈ N}),
where
• N is a finite set consisting of the players of the game.
• M is a finite set whose elements are the moves (or actions) available to players (and nature) during
the game.
• H is a finite set of finite sequences of moves (elements of M ) that is closed under prefixes, so that
if h ∈ H and h′ is a prefix of h, then h′ ∈ H . Intuitively, each member of H is a history. We
can identify the nodes in a game tree with the histories in H . Each node n is characterized by the
sequence of moves needed to reach n. A run inH is a terminal history, one that is not a strict prefix
of any other history in H . Let Z denote the set of runs of H . Let Mh = {m ∈M : h · 〈m〉 ∈ H}
(where we use · to denote concatenation of sequences); Mh is the set of moves that can be made
after history h.
• P : (H − Z) → N ∪ {c} is a function that assigns to each nonterminal history h a member of
N ∪{c}. (We can think of c as representing nature.) If P (h) = i, then player i moves after history
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h; if P (h) = c, then nature moves after h. Let Hi = {h : P (h) = i} be the set of all histories
after which player i moves.
• fc is a function that associates with every history for which P (h) = c a probability measure
fc(· | h) on Mh. Intuitively, fc(· | h) describes the probability of nature’s moves once history h
is reached.
• Ii is a partition of Hi with the property that if h and h′ are in the same cell of the partition then
Mh = Mh′ , i.e., the same set of moves is available for every history in a cell of the partition.
Intuitively, if h and h′ are in the same cell of Ii, then h and h′ are indistinguishable from i’s point
of view; i considers history h′ possible if the actual history is h, and vice versa. A cell I ∈ Ii is
called an (i-)information set.
• ui : Z → R is a payoff function for player i, assigning a real number (i’s payoff) to each run of
the game.
An augmented game is defined much like an extensive game. The only essential difference is that at
each nonterminal history we not only determine the player moving but also her awareness level. There
are also extra moves of nature that intuitively capture players’ uncertainty regarding the awareness level
of their opponents. Formally, given an extensive game Γ = (N,M,H,P, fc, {Ii : i ∈ N}, {ui : i ∈
N}), an augmented game based on Γ is a tuple Γ+ = (N+,M+,H+, P+, f+c , {I+i : i ∈ N+}, {u
+
i :
i ∈ N+}, {A+i : i ∈ N
+}), where (N+,M+,H+, P+, f+c , {I+i : i ∈ N+}, {u
+
i : i ∈ N
+}) is a
standard extensive game with perfect recall2 and A+i : H
+
i → 2
H describes i’s awareness level at each
history at which he moves. Γ+ must satisfy some consistency conditions. These conditions basically
ensure that
• a player’s awareness level depends only on the information she has as captured by her information
sets;
• players do not forget histories that they were aware of; and
• there is common knowledge of (1) what the payoffs are in the underlying game and (2) what the
information sets are in the underlying game.
The formal conditions are not needed in this paper, so we omit them here.
An augmented game describes either the modeler’s view of the game or the subjective view of the
game of one of the players, and includes both moves of the underlying game and moves of nature that
change awareness. A game with awareness collects all these different views, and describes, in each view,
what view other players have. Formally, a game with awareness based on Γ = (N,M,H,P, fc, {Ii :
i ∈ N}, {ui : i ∈ N}) is a tuple Γ∗ = (G,Γm,F), where
• G is a countable set of augmented games based on Γ, of which one is Γm;
• F maps an augmented game Γ+ ∈ G and a history h in Γ+ such that P+(h) = i to a pair (Γh, I),
where Γh ∈ G and I is an i-information set in game Γh.
2A game with perfect recall is one where, players remember all the actions they have performed and all the information
sets they have passed through; see [Osborne and Rubinstein 1994] for the formal definition.
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Intuitively, Γm is the game from the point of view of an omniscient modeler. If player i moves at h in
game Γ+ ∈ G and F(Γ+, h) = (Γh, I), then Γh is the game that i believes to be the true game when
the history is h, and I consists of the set of histories in Γh that i currently considers possible.
The augmented game Γm and the mapping F must satisfy a number of consistency conditions.
The conditions on the modeler’s game ensures that the modeler is aware of all the players and moves
of the underlying game, and that he understands how nature’s moves work in the underlying game Γ.
The game Γm can be thought of as a description of “reality”; it describes the effect of moves in the
underlying game and how players’ awareness levels change. The other games in G describe a player’s
subjective view of the situation.
There are also ten constraints on the mapping F that capture desirable properties of awareness.
Rather than describing all ten constraints here, we briefly describe a few of them, to give some idea of
the intuition behind these constraints. Suppose that F(Γ+, h) = (Γh, I) and A+i (h) = a,3 then the
following conditions hold.
C1. {h : h ∈ Hh} = a, where h is the subsequence of h consisting of all the moves in h that are also
in the set of moves M of the underlying game Γ.
C2. If h′ ∈ Hh and P h(h′) = j, then Ahj (h′) ⊆ a and Mh′ ∩ {m : h
′
· 〈m〉 ∈ a} = Mhh′ .
C5. If h′ ∈ H+, P+(h′) = i, A+i (h′) = a, then if h and h′ are in the same information set of Γ+,
then F(Γ+, h′) = (Γh, I), while if h is a prefix or a suffix of h′, then F(Γ+, h′) = (Γh, I ′) for
some i-information set I ′.
C8. For all histories h′ ∈ I , there exists a prefix h′1 of h′ such that P h(h′1) = i and F(Γh, h′1) =
(Γ′, I ′) iff there exists a prefix h1 of h such that P+(h1) = i and F(Γ+, h1) = (Γ′, I ′). Moreover,
h′1 · 〈m〉 is a prefix of h′ iff h1 · 〈m〉 is a prefix of h.
C9. There exists a history h′ ∈ I such that for every prefix h′′ · 〈m〉 of h′, if P h(h′′) = j ∈ Nh and
F(Γh, h′′) = (Γ′, I ′), then for all h1 ∈ I ′, h1 · 〈m〉 ∈ H ′.
Suppose that F(Γ+, h) = (Γh, I). Player i moving at history h in Γ+ thinks the actual game is Γh.
Moreover, i thinks he is in the information set of I of Γh. C1 guarantees that the set of histories of the
underlying game player i is aware of is exactly the set of histories of the underlying game that appear
in Γh. C2 states that no player in Γh can be aware of histories not in a. The second part of C2 implies
that the set of moves available for player j at h′ is just the set of moves that player i is aware of that are
available for j at h′ in the underlying game. C5 says that player i’s subjective view of the game changes
only if i becomes aware of more moves and is the same at histories in H+ that i cannot distinguish.
C8 is a consequence of the perfect recall assumption. C8 says that if, at history h, i considers h′
possible, then for every prefix h′1 of h′ there is a corresponding prefix of h where i considers himself to
be playing the same game, and similarly, for every prefix of h there is a prefix of h′ where i considers
himself to be playing the same game. Moreover, i makes the same move at these prefixes. The intuition
behind condition C9 is that player i knows that player j only make moves that j is aware of. Therefore,
player i must consider at least one history h′ where he believes that every player j made a move that j
3As in our earlier paper, we use the convention that the components of a (standard or augmented) game Γ+ are labeled
with the same superscript +, so that we have M+, H+, A+i , and so on.
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was aware of. It follows from conditions on augmented games, C1, C2, and C9 that there is a run going
through I where every player j makes a move that player i believes that j is aware of.
It may seem that by making F a function we cannot capture a player’s uncertainty about the game
being played or uncertainty about opponents’ unawareness about histories. However, we can capture
such uncertainty by folding it into nature’s initial move in the game the player consider possible while
moving. It should be clear that this gives a general approach to capturing such uncertainties.
We identify a standard extensive game Γ with the game ({Γm},Γm,F), where (abusing notation
slightly) Γm = (Γ, {Ai : i ∈ N}) and, for all histories h in an i-information set I in Γ, Ai(h) = H and
F(Γm, h) = (Γm, I). Thus, all players are aware of all the runs in Γ, and agree with each other and the
modeler that the game is Γ. This is the canonical representation of Γ as a game with awareness.
In [Halpern and Reˆgo 2006], we discussed generalizations of games with awareness to include situ-
ations where players may be aware of their own unawareness and, more generally, games where players
may not have common knowledge of the underlying game is; for example, players may disagree about
what the payoffs or the information sets are. With these models, we can capture a situation where, for
example, player i may think that another player j cannot make a certain a certain move, when in fact
j can make such a move. For ease of exposition, we do not discuss these generalizations further here.
However, it is not hard to show that the results of this paper can be extended to them in a straightforward
way.
Feinberg [2004, 2005] also studied games with awareness. Feinberg [2005] gives a definition of ex-
tended Nash equilibrium in normal-form games. Feinberg [2004] deals with extensive-form games and
defines solution concepts only indirectly, via a syntactic epistemic characterization. His approach lacks
a more direct semantic framework, which our model provides. Li [2006a] has also provided a model
of unawareness in extensive games, based on her earlier work on modeling unawareness [Li 2006b;
Li 2006c]. See [Halpern and Reˆgo 2006] for some further discussion of the relation between these ap-
proaches and ours.
3 GENERALIZED SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM
To explain generalized sequential equilibrium, we first review the notion of sequential equilibrium for
standard games.
3.1 SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM FOR STANDARD GAMES
Sequential equilibrium is defined with respect to an assessment, a pair (~σ, µ) where ~σ is a strategy
profile consisting of behavioral strategies and µ is a belief system, i.e., a function that determines for
every information set I a probability µI over the histories in I . Intuitively, if I is an information set for
player i, µI is i’s subjective assessment of the relative likelihood of the histories in I . Roughly speaking,
an assessment is a sequential equilibrium if for all players i, at every i-information set, (a) i chooses
a best response given the beliefs he has about the histories in that information set and the strategies of
other players, and (b) i’s beliefs are consistent with the strategy profile being played, in the sense that
they are calculated by conditioning the probability distribution induced by the strategy profile over the
histories on the information set.
Note that µI is defined even if I is reached with probability 0. Defining consistency at an informa-
tion set that is reached with probability 0 is somewhat subtle. In that case, intuitively, once information
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set I is reached player i moving at I must believe the game has been played according to an alter-
native strategy profile. In a sequential equilibrium, that alternative strategy profile consists of a small
perturbation of the original assessment where every move is chosen with positive probability.
Given a strategy profile ~σ, let Pr~σ be the probability distribution induced by ~σ over the possible
histories of the game. Intuitively, Pr~σ(h) is the product of the probability of each of the moves in h. For
simplicity we assume fc > 0, so that if ~σ is such that every player chooses all of his moves with positive
probability, then for every history h, Pr~σ(h) > 0.4 For any history h of the game, define Pr~σ(· | h)
to be the conditional probability distribution induced by ~σ over the possible histories of the game given
that the current history is h. Intuitively, Pr~σ(h′ | h) is 0 if h is not a prefix of h′, is 1 if h = h′, and is the
product of the probability of each of the moves in the path from h to h′ if h is a prefix of h′. Formally,
an assessment (~σ, µ) is a sequential equilibrium if it satisfies the following properties:
• Sequential rationality. For every information set I and player i and every behavioral strategy σ
for player i,
EUi((~σ, µ) | I) ≥ EUi(((~σ−i, σ), µ) | I),
where EUi((~σ, µ) | I) =
∑
h∈I
∑
z∈Z µI(h) Pr~σ(z | h)ui(z).
• Consistency between belief system and strategy profile. If ~σ consists of completely mixed (behav-
ior) strategies, that is, ones that assign positive probability to every action at every information
set, then for every information set I and history h in I ,
µI(h) =
Pr~σ(h)∑
h′∈I Pr~σ(h
′)
.
Otherwise, there exists a sequence (~σn, µn), n = 1, 2, 3, . . ., of assessments such that ~σn consists
of completely mixed strategies, (~σn, µn) is consistent in the above sense, and limn→∞(~σn, µn) =
(~σ, µ).
Sequential equilibrium is not a reasonable solution concept for games with awareness for the same
reason that Nash equilibrium is not a reasonable solution concept for games with awareness; it requires
that a player be aware of the set of possible strategies available to other players and to him. In order to
define a generalized notion of sequential equilibrium for games with awareness, we first need to define
a generalized notion of assessment for games with awareness. We first need a generalized notion of
strategy, which we defined in our earlier paper.
Intuitively, a strategy describes what i will do in every possible situation that can arise. This no
longer makes sense in games with awareness, since a player no longer understands in advance all the
possible situations that can arise. For example, player i cannot plan in advance for what will happen
if he becomes aware of something he is initially unaware of. We solved this problem in our earlier
paper as follows. Let Gi = {Γ′ ∈ G : for some Γ+ ∈ G and h in Γ+, P+(h) = i and F(Γ+, h) =
(Γ′, ·)}. Intuitively, Gi consists of the games that i views as the real game in some history. Rather than
considering a single strategy in a game Γ∗ = (G,Γm,F) with awareness, we considered a collection
{σi,Γ′ : Γ
′ ∈ Gi} of local strategies. Intuitively, a local strategy σi,Γ′ for game Γ′ is the strategy that i
would use if iwere called upon to play and i thought that the true game was Γ′. Thus, the domain of σi,Γ′
4See [Myerson 1991] for a definition of sequential equilibrium in the case nature chooses some of its move with probability
0.
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consists of pairs (Γ+, h) such that Γ+ ∈ G, h is a history in Γ+, P+(h) = i, and F(Γ+, h) = (Γ′, I).
Let (Γh, I)∗ = {(Γ′, h) : F(Γ′, h) = (Γh, I)}; we call (Γh, I)∗ a generalized information set.
Definition 3.1: Given a game Γ∗ = (G,Γm,F) with awareness, a local strategy σi,Γ′ for agent i is a
function mapping pairs (Γ+, h) such that h is a history where i moves in Γ+ and F(Γ+, h) = (Γ′, I) to
a probability distribution over M ′h′ , the moves available at a history h′ ∈ I , such that σi,Γ′(Γ1, h1) =
σi,Γ′(Γ2, h2) if (Γ1, h1) and (Γ2, h2) are in the same generalized information set. A generalized strategy
profile of Γ∗ = (G,Γm,F) is a set of local strategies ~σ = {σi,Γ′ : i ∈ N,Γ′ ∈ Gi}.
The belief system, the second component of the assessment, is a function from information sets I
to probability distribution over the histories in I . Intuitively, it captures how likely each of the histories
in I is for the player moving at I . For standard games this distribution can be arbitrary, since the player
considers every history in the information set possible. This is no longer true in games with awareness. It
is possible that a player is playing game Γ1 but believes he is playing a different game Γ2. Furthermore,
in an augmented game, there may be some histories in an i-information set that include moves of which
i is not aware; player i cannot consider these histories possible. To deal with these problems, we define
µ to be a generalized belief system if it is a function from generalized information sets to a probability
distribution over the set of histories in the generalized information set that the player considers possible.
Definition 3.2: A generalized belief system µ is a function that associates each generalized information
set (Γ′, I)∗ with a probability distribution µΓ′,I over the set {(Γ′, h) : h ∈ I}. A generalized assessment
is a pair (~σ, µ), where ~σ is a generalized strategy profile and µ is a generalized belief system.
We can now define what it means for a generalized assessment (~σ∗, µ∗) to be a generalized sequen-
tial equilibrium of a game with awareness. The definition is essentially identical to that of (~σ, µ) being
a sequential equilibrium; the use of EUi in the definition of sequential rationality is replaced by EUi,Γ′ ,
where EUi,Γ′((~σ∗, µ∗) | I) is the conditional expected payoff for i in the game Γ′, given that strategy
profile ~σ∗ is used, information set I has been reached, and player i’s beliefs about the histories in I are
described by µ∗Γ′,I . We leave the straightforward modifications of the definition to the reader. It is easy
to see that (~σ, µ) is a sequential equilibrium of a standard game Γ iff (~σ, µ) is a (generalized) sequen-
tial equilibrium of the canonical representation of Γ as a game with awareness. Thus, our definition of
generalized sequential equilibrium generalizes the standard definition.
To better understand the concept of generalized sequential equilibrium concept, consider the game
shown in Figure 2. Suppose that both players 1 and 2 are aware of all runs of the game, but player 1
(falsely) believes that player 2 is aware only of the runs not involving L and believes that player 1 is
aware of these runs as well. Also suppose that player 2 is aware of all of this; that is, player 2’s view of
the game is the same as the modeler’s view of the game Γm shown in Figure 2. While moving at node
1.1, player 1 considers the true game to be identical to the modeler’s game except that from player 1’s
point of view, while moving at 2.1, player 2 believes the true game is Γ2.2, shown in Figure 3.
This game has a unique generalized sequential equilibrium where player 2 chooses r and player 1
chooses A in Γ2.2. Believing that player 2 will move r, player 1 best responds by choosing L at node
1.1. Since player 2 knows all this at node 2.1 in Γm, she chooses l at this node. Thus, if players follow
their equilibrium strategies, the payoff vector is (−10,−1). In this situation, player 2 would be better
off is she could let player 1 know that she is aware of move L, since then player 1 would play A and both
players would receive 1. On the other hand, if we slightly modify the game by making u2(〈L, l〉) = 3,
then player 2 would benefit from the fact that 1 believes that she is unaware of move L.
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Figure 2: The modeler’s game Γm.
Figure 3: Player 2’s view of the game from point of view of player 1.
3.2 EXISTENCE OF GENERALIZED EQUILIBRIA
We now want to show that every game with awareness Γ∗ has at least one generalized sequential equi-
librium. To prove that a game with awareness Γ∗ has a generalized Nash equilibrium, we constructed a
standard game Γν with perfect recall and showed that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between
the set of generalized Nash equilibrium of Γ∗ and the set of Nash equilibrium of Γν . Intuitively, Γν is
constructed by essentially “gluing together” all the games Γ′ ∈ G, except that only histories in Γ′ that
can actually be played according to the players’ awareness level are considered.
More formally, given a game Γ∗ = (G,Γm,F) with awareness, let ν be a probability on G that
assigns each game in G positive probability. (Here is where we use the fact that G is countable.) For
each Γ′ ∈ G, let ⌊HΓ′⌋ = {h ∈ HΓ′ : for every prefix h1 · 〈m〉 of h, if P ′(h1) = i ∈ N and
F(Γ′, h1) = (Γ
′′, I), then for all h2 ∈ I , h2 · 〈m〉 ∈ H ′′}. The histories in ⌊HΓ
′
⌋ are the ones that can
actually be played according to the players’ awareness levels.
Let Γν be the standard game such that
• Nν = {(i,Γ′) : Γ′ ∈ Gi};
• Mν = G ∪Γ′∈G ⌊M
Γ′⌋, where ⌊MΓ′⌋ is the set of moves that occur in ⌊HΓ′⌋;
• Hν = 〈 〉 ∪ {〈Γ′〉 · h : Γ′ ∈ G, h ∈ ⌊HΓ
′
⌋};
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• P ν(〈 〉) = c, and
P ν(〈Γh〉 · h′) =


(i,Γh
′
) if P h(h′) = i ∈ N and
F(Γh, h′) = (Γh
′
, ·),
c if P h(h′) = c;
• f νc (Γ
′|〈 〉) = ν(Γ′) and f νc (·|〈Γh〉 · h′) = fhc (·|h′) if P h(h′) = c;
• Iνi,Γ′ is a partition of Hνi,Γ′ where two histories 〈Γ1〉 · h1 and 〈Γ1〉 · h1 are in the same information
set 〈Γ′, I〉∗ iff (Γ1, h1) and (Γ2, h2) are in the same generalized information set (Γ′, I)∗;
• uνi,Γ′(〈Γ
h〉 · z) =
{
uhi (z) if Γh = Γ′,
0 if Γh 6= Γ′.
Unfortunately, while it is the case that there is a 1-1 correspondence between the Nash equilibria
of Γν and the generalized Nash equilibria of Γ∗, , this correspondence breaks down for sequential
equilibria. To see why consider the modified version of prisoner’s dilemma Γp, described in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Γp: modified prisoner’s dilemma.
Besides being able to cooperate (CA) or defect (DA), player A who moves first has also the option
of escaping (EA). If player A escapes, then the game is over; if player A cooperates or defects, then
player B may also cooperate (CB) or defect (DB). Suppose further that in the modeler’s game,
• both A and B are aware of all histories of Γp;
• with probability p, A believes that B is unaware of the extra move EA, and with probability 1−p,
A believes B is aware of all histories;
• if A believes B is unaware of EA, then A believes that B believes that it is common knowledge
that the game being played contains all histories but EA;
• if A believes B is aware of EA, then A believes that B believes that there is common knowledge
that the game being played is Γp;
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• B believes that it is common knowledge that the game being played is Γp.
We need four augmented games to model this situation:
• Γm is the game from the modeler’s point of view;
• ΓA is the game from A’s point of view when she is called to move in the modeler’s game;
• ΓB.1 is the game from B’s point of view when he is called to move in game ΓA after nature
chooses he is unaware of EA and is also the game from A’s point of view when she is called to
move in ΓB.1; and
• ΓB.2 is the game from B’s point of view when he is called to move in game ΓA after nature
chooses awareB ; ΓB.2 is also the game from B’s point of view when he is called to move at Γm
and the game from A’s point of view when she is called to move in ΓB.2.
Although Γm and ΓB.2 have the same game tree as Γp, they are different augmented games, since the
F function is defined differently at histories in these games. For example, F(Γm, 〈 〉) = (ΓA, {unawareB ,awareB}) 6=
(ΓB.2, 〈 〉) = F(ΓB.2, 〈 〉). For this reason, we use different labels for the nodes of theses games. Let
A.3 and B.2 (resp., A.2 and B.2) be the labels of the nodes in game Γm (resp., ΓB.2) corresponding to
A and B in Γp, respectively. ΓA and ΓB.1 are shown in Figures 5 and 6, respectively.5
• In the modeler’s game Γm, A believes she is playing game ΓA, and B believes he is playing game
ΓB.2.
• In game ΓA, nature chooses move unawareB with probability p and awareB with probability 1−p.
Then A moves and believes she is playing ΓA. At node B.1, B believes he is playing ΓB.1, and
at node B.2, B believes he is playing ΓB.2.
• In game ΓB.1, A and B both believe that the game is ΓB.1.
• In game ΓB.2, A and B both believe that the game is ΓB.2.
The game Γν is the result of pasting together Γm, ΓA, ΓB.1, and ΓB.2. There are 5 players:
(A,ΓA), (A,ΓB.1), (A,ΓB.2), (B,ΓB.1), and (B,ΓB.2). (A,ΓB.1) and (B,ΓB.1) are playing stan-
dard prisoner’s dilemma and therefore both should defect with probability 1; (B,ΓB.1) must believe
he is in the history where (A,ΓB.1) defected with probability 1. (A,ΓA) and (A,ΓB.2) choose the
extra move EA with probability 1, since it gives A a payoff of 5. The subtlety arises in the beliefs
of (B,ΓB.2) in the generalized information set (ΓB.2, {CA,DA})∗, since this generalized informa-
tion set is reached with probability zero. Note that (ΓB.2, {CA,DA})∗ = {〈Γm, CA〉, 〈Γm,DA〉,
〈ΓA, awareB , CA〉, 〈Γ
A, awareB ,DA〉, 〈Γ
B.2, CA〉, 〈Γ
B.2,DA〉}. By the definition of sequential equi-
librium, player (B,ΓB.2) will have to consider a sequence of strategies where all these histories are
assigned positive probability. Although in general this is not a problem, note that (B,ΓB.2) is meant to
represent the type of player B that considers only histories in game ΓB.2 possible. Thus, intuitively, he
should assign positive probability only to the histories {〈ΓB.2, CA〉, 〈ΓB.2,DA〉}.
5We abuse notation and use the same label for nodes in different augmented games that are in the same generalized
information set. For example, A.3 is a label at both Γm and ΓA.
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Figure 5: ΓA.
Figure 6: ΓB.1.
To see how this leads to a problem, first note that there is a sequential equilibrium of Γν where
(B,ΓB.2) believes with probability 1 that the true history is 〈ΓA,awareB , CA〉, (A,ΓB.2) chooses EA
with probability 1, and (B,ΓB.2) chooses CB with probability 1. It is rational for (B,ΓB.2) to choose
CB because (B,ΓB.2) assigns probability 1 to the first move of nature in Γν be ΓA. Since his utility is
0 for every run in Γν whose first move is ΓA, his expected utility is 0 no matter what move he makes at
the generalized information set, given his beliefs.
There is no reasonable definition of generalized sequential equilibrium corresponding to this se-
quential equilibrium of Γν . Player B while moving at node B.2 would never cooperate, since this is a
strictly dominated strategy for him in the game that he considers to be the actual game, namely ΓB.2.
The problem is that there is nothing in the definition of sequential equilibrium that guarantees that
the belief system of a sequential equilibrium in Γν assigns probability zero to histories that players
are unaware of in the game Γ∗ with awareness. We want to define a modified notion of sequential
equilibrium for standard games that guarantees that the belief system in Γν associates each information
set with a probability distribution over a pre-specified subset of the histories in the information, which
consists only of the histories in the information set player i actually considers possible. In this example,
the pre-specified subset would be {〈ΓB.2, CA〉, 〈ΓB.2,DA〉}.
4 CONDITIONAL SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM
In the standard definition of sequential equilibrium for extensive games, it is implicitly assumed that
every player considers all histories in his information set possible. This is evident from the fact that if a
strategy profile that is part of a sequential equilibrium assigns positive probability to every move, then
by the consistency requirement the belief system also assigns positive probability to every history of
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every information set of the game. Therefore, this notion of equilibrium is not strong enough to capture
situations where a player is certain that some histories in his information set will not occur. The notion
of conditional sequential equilibrium, which we now define, is able to deal with such situations. It gen-
eralizes sequential equilibrium: in a game where every player considers every history in his information
set possible, the set of conditional sequential equilibria and the set of sequential equilibria coincide.
Given a standard extensive game Γ, define a possibility system K on Γ to be a function that deter-
mines for every information set I a nonempty subset of I consisting of the histories in I that the player
moving at I considers possible. We assume that K is common knowledge among players of the game,
so that every player understands what histories are considered possible by everyone else in the game. If
I is an i-information set, intuitively i should be indifferent among all runs that go through histories in
I − K(I), since i believes that those runs will not occur and every other player knows that. Thus, for a
given Γ, a possibility system K must satisfy the following requirement: if z and z′ are two runs going
through histories in I −K(I) and I is an i-information set, then ui(z) = ui(z′).
Given a pair (Γ,K), a K-assessment is a pair (~σ, µ), where ~σ is a strategy profile of Γ, and µ is a
restricted belief system, i.e., a function that determines for every information set I of Γ a probability
µI over the histories in K(I). Intuitively, if I is an information set for player i, µI is i’s subjective
assessment of the relative likelihood of the histories player i considers possible while moving at I ,
namely K(I). As in the definition of sequential equilibrium, a K-assessment (~σ, µ) is a conditional
sequential equilibrium with respect to K if (a) at every information set where a player moves he chooses
a best response given the beliefs he has about the histories that he considers possible in that information
set and the strategies of other players, and (b) his restricted beliefs must be consistent with the strategy
profile being played and the possibility system, in the sense that they are calculated by conditioning
the probability distribution induced by the strategy profile over the histories considered possible on
the information set. Formally, the definition of (~σ, µ) being a conditional sequential equilibrium is
identical to that of sequential equilibrium, except that the summation in the definition of EUi(~σ, µ) | I)
and µI(h) is taken over histories in K(I) rather than histories in I . It is immediate that if K(I) = I for
every information set I of the game, then the set of conditional sequential equilibria with respect to K
coincides with the set of sequential equilibria. The next theorem shows that set of conditional sequential
equilibria for a large class of extensive games that includes Γν is nonempty.
Theorem 4.1: Let Γ be an extensive game with perfect recall and countably many players such that
(a) each player has only finitely many pure strategies and (b) each player’s payoff depends only on the
strategy of finitely many other players. Let K be an arbitrary possibility system. Then there exists at
least one K-assessment that is a conditional sequential equilibrium of Γ with respect to K.
We now prove that every game of awareness has a generalized sequential equilibrium by defining a
possibility system K on Γν and showing that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of
conditional sequential equilibria of Γν with respect to K and the set of generalized sequential equilibria
of Γ∗.
Theorem 4.2: For all probability measures ν on G, if ν gives positive probability to all games in G, and
K(〈Γ′, I〉∗) = {〈Γ′, h〉 : h ∈ I} for every information set 〈Γ′, I〉∗ of Γν , then (~σ′, µ′) is a generalized
sequential equilibrium of Γ∗ iff (~σ, µ) is a conditional sequential equilibrium of Γν with respect to K,
where σi,Γ′(〈Γh〉 · h′) = σ′i,Γ′(Γh, h′) and µ′Γ′,I = µ〈Γ′,I〉∗ .
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Since Γν satisfies all the conditions of Theorem 4.1, it easily follows from Theorems 4.1 and 4.2
that every game with awareness has at least one generalized sequential equilibrium.
Although it is not true that every conditional sequential equilibrium is also a sequential equilibrium
of an arbitrary game, the next theorem shows there is a close connection between these notions of
equilibrium. If (~σ, µ) is a conditional sequential equilibrium with respect to some possibility system K,
then there exists a belief system µ′ such that (~σ, µ′) is a sequential equilibrium.
Theorem 4.3: For every extensive game Γ with countably many players where each player has finitely
many pure strategies and for every possibility system K, if (~σ, µ) is a conditional sequential equilibrium
of Γ with respect to K, then there exists a belief system µ′ such that (~σ, µ′) is a sequential equilibrium
of Γ.
5 RATIONALIZABILITY AND GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we analyze the relationship between the notions of rationalizability and generalized Nash
equilibrium, providing some more intuition about the latter.
The usual justification for Nash equilibrium is that a player’s strategy must be a best response to
the strategies selected by other players in the equilibrium, because he can deduce what those strategies
are. However, in most strategic situations, it is not the case that a player can deduce the strategies
used by other players. Since every player tries to maximize his expected payoff and this is common
knowledge, the best that a player can hope to do is to deduce a set of reasonable strategies for the
other players. Here, we take a “reasonable strategy” to be a best response to some reasonable beliefs a
player might hold about the strategy profile being played. This is the intuition that the rationalizability
solution concept tries to capture. Even though a notion of rationalizability for extensive-form games
was proposed by Pearce [1984], rationalizability is more widely applied in normal-form games. In
this section, we explore the relationship between rationalizability and generalized Nash equilibrium in
games with awareness where in the underlying game each player moves only once, and these moves are
made simultaneously (or, equivalently, a player does not know the moves made by other players before
making his own move). We show that, given an underlying game Γ satisfying this requirement, a pure
strategy profile contains only rationalizable strategies iff it is the strategy profile used by the players
in the modeler’s game in some (pure) generalized Nash equilibrium of a game Γ∗ with awareness. If
we think of rationalizability as characterizing “best response to your beliefs” and Nash equilibrium
characterizing “best response to what is actually played”, then this result shows that in the framework
of games with awareness, since the game is not common knowledge, the line between these two notions
is somewhat blurred.
We start by reviewing the notion of rationalizability for standard normal-form games. Let Ci be the
set of available pure strategies for player i; C = ×i∈NCi is thus the set of pure strategy profiles. Let
∆(M) denote the set of all probability distributions on M . Suppose that each player i is rational and is
commonly known to choose a strategy from a subset Di of Ci. Let D−i = ×j 6=iDi and
B(D−i) = {argmaxsi∈CiEUi((si, π(D−i))) :
for some π ∈ ∆(D−i)};
that is, B(D−i) consists of the strategies in Ci that are best responses to some belief that player i could
have about the strategies other players are using.
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The set S = ×i∈NSi of correlated rationalizable strategies is characterized by the following two
properties: (a) for all i ∈ N , Si ⊆ B(S−i) and (b) S is the largest set satisfying condition (a), in the
sense that, for every set of strategy profiles D satisfying (a), we have that D ⊆ S . It is not hard to show
that for every player i, Si = B(S−i). A strategy si ∈ Si is called a correlated rationalizable strategy
for player i.6 7
It turns out that we can construct S by the following iterative procedure. Let C0i = Ci for all i ∈ N .
Define Cji = B(C
j−1
−i ) for j ≥ 1. Since there are finitely many strategies it is easy to see that there exists
a finite k such that Cji = Cki for all j ≥ k. It can be shown that Si = limj→∞ C
j
i = C
k
i . It is also easy
to see that if ~σ is a (behavioral) Nash equilibrium, then every pure strategy that is played with positive
probability according to ~σ is rationalizable (where the probability with which a pure strategy is played
according to ~σ is the product of the probability of each of its moves according to ~σ).
We now explore the relationship between rationalizability in an underlying game Γ in normal-form
and generalized Nash equilibrium in a special class of games with awareness based on Γ. Given a
standard game Γ and a pure strategy profile ~s consisting of rationalizable strategies, we define a game
with awareness Γ∗(~s) = (G,Γm,F) such that (a) there exists a generalized Nash equilibrium of Γ∗(~s),
where si is the strategy followed by player i in Γm, and (b) every local strategy in every pure generalized
Nash equilibrium of Γ∗(~s) is rationalizable in Γ. To understand the intuition behind the construction,
note that if si is a pure correlated rationalizable strategy of player i in Γ, then si must be a best response
to some probability distribution πsi over the set S−i of pure correlated rationalizable strategies of i’s
opponents. The idea will be to include a game Γsi in G that captures the beliefs that make si a best
response. Let ~s 1, . . . , ~sm be the strategy profiles in S−i that get positive probability according to πsi .
(There are only finitely many, since S−i consists of only pure strategies.) Let Γsi be the game where
nature initially makes one of m moves, say c1, . . . , cm (one corresponding to each strategy that gets
positive probability according to πsi), where the probability of move cj is πsi(~s j). After nature’s
choice a copy of Γ is played. All the histories in Γsi in which player i is about to move are in the same
information set of player i; that is, player i does not know nature’s move. However, all the other players
know nature’s move. Finally, all players are aware of all runs of Γ at every history in Γsi . Note that if h
is a history where player i thinks game Γsi is the actual game, and believes that other players will play
~s
j
−i after nature’s move cj , then player i believes that si is a best response at h.
Given a pure strategy profile ~s of the game Γ, let Γ∗(~s) = (G,Γm,F) be the following game with
awareness:
• Γm = (Γ, {Ai : i ∈ N}), where for every player i and every history h ∈ Hmi , Ai(h) = H (the
set of all histories in Γ);
• G = {Γm} ∪ {Γs
′
i : s′i ∈ Si, i ∈ N};
• for an augmented game in Γ+ ∈ (G − {Γm}) and a history h of Γ+ of the form 〈s′−i〉 · h′,
– if P+(h) = i, then F(Γ+, h) = (Γ+, I) where I is the information set containing h;
6From now on, we use ~s = (s1, . . . , sn) to denote pure strategy profiles, and will continue to use ~σ for possibly nonpure
strategy profiles.
7In the literature, it is often assumed that each player chooses his strategy independently of the others and that this is
common knowledge. If we make this assumption, we get a somewhat stronger solution concept (at least, if |N | ≥ 3), which
we call uncorrelated rationalizability. Essentially the same results as we prove here for correlated rationalizability hold for
uncorrelated rationalizability; we omit further details here.
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– if P+(h) = j ∈ N−{i} and s′j is the strategy of player j specified by s′−i, then F(Γ+, h) =
(Γs
′
j , I), where I is the unique j-information set in game Γs
′
j ;
• for h ∈ Hmi , F(Γm, h) = (Γsi , I), where I is the unique i-information set in game Γsi .
The intuition is that if ~s is a strategy profile such that, for all i ∈ N , si is a rationalizable strategy
for player i in Γ, then at the (unique) i-information set of Γm, i considers the actual game to be Γsi .
For this particular game with awareness, there exists a generalized Nash equilibrium where the strategy
for each player i in the modeler’s game is si. Conversely, only rationalizable strategies are used in
any pure generalized Nash equilibrium of Γ∗(~s). There is only one small problem with this intuition:
strategies in Γ and local strategies for augmented games in Γ∗(~s) are defined over different objects.
The former are defined over information sets of the underlying game Γ and the latter are defined over
generalized information sets of Γ∗(s). Fortunately, this problem is easy to deal with: we can identify a
local strategy in Γ∗(~s) with a strategy in Γ in the obvious way. By definition of Γ∗(~s), for every player
i and augmented game Γ′ ∈ Gi, the domain of the local strategy σi,Γ′ consists of a unique generalized
information set. We denote this information set by Ii,Γ′ . For each local strategy σi,Γ′ of Γ∗(~s), we
associate the strategy σi,Γ′ in the underlying game Γ such that σi,Γ′(Ii,Γ′) = σi,Γ′(I), where I is the
unique i-information set in Γ.
The following theorem summarizes the relationship between correlated rationalizable strategies in
Γ and generalized Nash equilibrium of games with awareness.
Theorem 5.1: If Γ is a standard normal-form game and ~s is a (pure) strategy profile such that for all
i ∈ N , si is a correlated rationalizable strategy of player i in Γ, then
(i) there is a (pure) generalized Nash equilibrium ~s ∗ of Γ∗(~s) such that for every player i, s∗i,Γsi = si;
(ii) for every (pure) generalized Nash equilibrium ~s ∗ of Γ∗(~s), for every local strategy s∗i,Γ′ for every
player i in ~s ∗, the strategy s∗i,Γ′ is correlated rationalizable for player i in Γ.
Note that Theorem 5.1 does not imply that for a fixed game with awareness, (pure) generalized Nash
equilibrium and generalized rationalizability coincide. These notions are incomparable for standard ex-
tensive games (cf. [Battigalli 1997; Pearce 1984]), so the corresponding generalized notions are incom-
parable when applied to the canonical representation of a standard game as a game with awareness. If we
restrict the underlying game to be in normal form, it can be shown that, just as in standard games, every
strategy in a pure generalized Nash equilibrium is (generalized) rationalizable. Since rationalizability
is usually defined for pure strategies in the literature [Myerson 1991; Osborne and Rubinstein 1994],
we focused on that case here. But it is not hard to show that an analogue of Theorem 5.1 holds for
behavioral rationalizable strategies as well.
Moving up a level, we might ask more generally for the appropriate interpretation of Nash equilib-
rium in games with awareness. In standard games with a unique Nash equilibrium, we could perhaps
argue that rational players will play their component of the equilibrium, since they can compute it and
realize that it is the only stable strategy. In games with several Nash equilibria, perhaps one can be
singled out as most salient, or some can be eliminated by using refinements of Nash equilibria.
To some extent, these considerations apply in games with awareness as well. If there is a unique
generalized Nash equilibrium, although a player cannot necessarily compute the whole equilibrium (for
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example, if it involves moves that he is not aware of), he can compute that part of the equilibrium that
is within the scope of his awareness. Thus, this argument for playing a Nash equilibrium lifts from
standard games to games with awareness. However, other arguments do not lift so well. For example, in
standard games, one argument for Nash equilibrium is that, over time, players will learn to play a Nash
equilibrium, for example, by playing a best response to their current beliefs. (However, this is not true
in general [Nachbar 1997; Nachbar 2005]. This argument will not work in the presence of awareness,
since playing the game repeatedly can make players aware of moves or of other players awareness, and
thus effectively change the game altogether.
Another way of interpreting Nash equilibrium in standard games is in terms of evolutionary game
theory. This approach works with awareness as well. Suppose that we have populations consisting
of each awareness type of each player, and that at each time step we draw without replacement one
individual of each of these populations and let them play the game once. If the sample individuals are
playing an equilibrium strategy, they do not have incentive to deviate unilaterally given their beliefs that
the other players will continue to follow the equilibrium strategies.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we further developed the framework of games with awareness by analyzing how to gener-
alize sequential equilibrium to such games. Other solution concepts can be generalized in a similar way.
Although we have not checked all the details for all solution concepts, we believe that techniques like
those used in our earlier paper to prove existence of generalized Nash equilibrium and ones similar to
those used in this paper for generalized sequential equilibrium will be useful for proving the existence
of other generalized solution concepts. For example, consider the notion of (trembling hand) perfect
equilibrium [Selten 1975]. in normal-form games. A strategy profile ~σ is a perfect equilibrium if there
exists some sequence of strategies (~σk)∞k=0, each assigning positive probability to every available move,
that converges pointwise to ~σ such that for each player i, the strategy σi is a best response to ~σk−i for all
k. The definition of generalized perfect equilibrium in games with awareness is the same as in standard
games, except that we use generalized strategies rather than strategies, and require that for every local
strategy σi,Γ′ of every player i, σi,Γ′ is a best response to ~σk−(i,Γ′) in game Γ
′ for all k. To prove that
every game with awareness in normal form has a generalized perfect equilibrium, we prove an analogue
of Theorem 3.1(b) in [Halpern and Reˆgo 2006], giving a correspondence between the set of general-
ized perfect equilibria of Γ∗ and the set of perfect equilibria of Γν . The existence of a generalized
perfect equilibrium follows from the existence of a perfect equilibrium in Γν ; the existence of a perfect
equilibrium in Γν follows from Lemma A.2.
In our earlier work, we showed that our definitions could be extended in a straightforward way to
games with awareness of unawareness; that is, games where one player might be aware that there are
moves that another player (or even she herself) might be able to make, although she is not aware of
what they are. Such awareness of unawareness can be quite relevant in practice. We captured the fact
that player i is aware that, at a node h in the game tree, there is a move that j can make she (i) is not
aware of was by having i’s subjective representation of the game include a “virtual” move for j at node
h. Since i does not understand perfectly what can happen after this move, the payoffs associated with
runs that follow a virtual move represent what player i believes will happen if this run is played and may
bear no relationship to the actual payoffs in the underlying game. We showed that a generalized Nash
equilibrium exists in games with awareness of unawareness. It is straightforward to define generalized
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sequential equilibrium for those games and to prove its existence using the techniques of this paper; we
leave details to the reader.
We have focused here on generalizing solution concepts that have proved useful in standard games,
where there is no lack of awareness. Introducing awareness allows us to consider other solution con-
cepts. For example, Ozbay [2007] proposes an approach where a player’s beliefs about the probability
of revealed moves of nature, that the player was initially unaware of, are formed as part of the equilib-
rium definition. We hope to explore the issue of which solution concepts are most appropriate in games
with awareness in future work.
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A PROOF OF THEOREMS
A.1 PROOF OF THEOREMS 4.1, 4.2, AND 4.3
Theorem 4.1: Let Γ be an extensive game with perfect recall and countably many players such that
(a) each player has only finitely many pure strategies and (b) each player’s payoff depends only on the
strategy of finitely many other players. Let K be an arbitrary possibility system. Then there exists at
least one K-assessment that is a conditional sequential equilibrium of Γ with respect to K.
Proof: We use the same ideas that are used to prove existence of standard sequential equilibrium,
following closely the presentation in [Myerson 1991]. The proof goes as follows. Given Γ, let ΓM
be the multiagent representation of Γ in normal form. We prove (Lemma A.1) that for every perfect
equilibrium σ of ΓM and every possibility system K, there exists a restricted belief system µ such that
(σ, µ) is a conditional sequential equilibrium of Γ with respect to K. Then we show (Lemma A.2) that
for Γ satisfying the hypothesis of the theorem, ΓM has at least one perfect equilibrium.
We now review the relevant definitions. A normal-form game is a tuple (N, ×i∈NCi, {ui : i ∈ N}),
where N is the set of players of the game, Ci is the collection of pure strategies available for player i in
the game, and ui is a payoff function that determines for each strategy profile in ×i∈NCi the payoff for
player i.
Given a standard extensive-form game Γ = (N,M,H,P, fc, {Ii : i ∈ N}, {ui : i ∈ N}), let
S∗ = ∪i∈NIi. Intuitively, we associate with each i-information set I ∈ Ii a temporary player that has
M(I) as its set possible strategies; S∗ is just the set of all temporary players in Γ. For each temporary
player I we associate a payoff function vI : ×I∈S∗M(I) → R such that if each temporary player
I chooses action aI , and σ is the pure strategy profile for Γ such that for every i ∈ N and I ∈ Ii,
σi(I) = aI , then vI(×I∈S∗aI) = ui(σ). The multiagent representation for Γ in normal form is the
tuple (S∗,×I∈S∗M(I), {vI : I ∈ S∗}).
Given any countable set B, let ∆(B) be the set of all probability measures over B, and let ∆0(B)
be the set of all probability measures over B whose support is all of B. Given a game in normal form
Γ = (N,×i∈NCi, {ui : i ∈ N}), a mixed strategy profile σ ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ci) is a perfect equilibrium
of Γ iff there exists a sequence (σˆk)∞k=1 such that (a) σˆk ∈ ×i∈N∆0(Ci) for k ≥ 1, (b) σˆk converges
pointwise to σ, and (c) σi ∈ argmaxτi∈∆(Ci)EUi(σˆk−i, τi) for all i ∈ N .
The following lemmas are analogues of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 in [Myerson 1991].
Lemma A.1: If ΓM is a multiagent representation of Γ in normal form, then for every perfect equilib-
rium σ of ΓM and every possibility system K, there exists a restricted belief system µ such that (σ, µ) is
a conditional sequential equilibrium of Γ with respect to K.
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Proof: The proof is almost identical to that of Theorem 5.1 in [Myerson 1991]. We focus on the neces-
sary changes, leaving the task of verifying that the rest of the proof goes without change to the reader.
Let (σˆk)∞k=1 ∈ ×I∈S∗∆(M(I)) be a sequence of behavioral strategy profiles satisfying conditions (a),
(b), and (c) of the definition of perfect equilibrium. For each k, define a belief system µk such that, for
each information set I , µk(I) is the probability over histories in K(I) defined as
µkI (h) =
Prσˆk(h)∑
h′∈K(I) Prσˆk(h
′)
.
If I is the set all information sets in ΓM , for each k, µk : I → [0, 1]. Thus, µk ∈ [0, 1]I ; and, by
Tychonoff’s Theorem, [0, 1]I is compact. Thus, there must be a convergent subsequence of µ1, µ2, . . ..
Suppose that this subsequence converges to µ. It is easy to see that µ is consistent with σ and K.
Let Z(I) denote the set of runs that do not contain any prefix in I . Let I be an arbitrary i-information
set of Γν . When agent I ∈ S∗ uses the randomized strategy ρI ∈ ∆(M(I)) against the strategies
specified by σˆk for all other agents, his expected payoff is
EUI(σˆ
k
−I , ρI) =
∑
h∈I
Pr
(σˆk
−I
,ρI)
(h)EUI(σˆ
k
−I , ρI | h) +
∑
z∈Z(I)
Pr
(σˆk
−I
,ρI)
(z)ui(z).
Note that for h ∈ I or h ∈ Z(I), Pr(σˆk
−I
,ρI)
(h) = Prσˆk(h), since this probability is independent of the
strategy used by player I . Also note that for all h ∈ I − K(I), EUI(σˆk−I , ρI | h) is independent of ρI .
Thus,
EUI(σˆ
k
−I , ρI)
=
∑
h∈K(I)
Pr
σˆk
(h)EUI(σˆ
k
−I , ρI | h) +
∑
z∈Z(I)
Pr
σˆk
(z)ui(z) + C
′
= (
∑
h∈K(I)
µkI (h)EUI(σˆ
k
−I , ρI | h))(
∑
h∈K(I)
Pr
σˆk
(h)) + C ′′,
where C ′ and C ′′ are two constants independent of ρI .
The rest of the proof proceeds just as the proof of Theorem 5.1 in [Myerson 1991]; we omit details
here.
Lemma A.2: If Γ is an extensive-form game with perfect recall such that (a) there are at most countably
many players, (b) each player has only finitely many pure strategies, and (c) the payoff of each player
depends only on the strategy of finitely many other players, then ΓM has at least one perfect equilibrium.
Proof: The proof is almost identical to that of Theorem 5.2 in [Myerson 1991]. Again, we focus on the
necessary changes, leaving it to the reader to verify that the rest of the proof goes without change. We
need to modify some of the arguments since ΓM is not a finite game; since it may contain countably
many players. First, by the same argument used to prove that Γν has at least one Nash equilibrium in our
earlier work [Halpern and Reˆgo 2006], we have that for any Γ satisfying the hypothesis of the lemma,
ΓM has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Let Ci be the set of pure strategies available for player i in ΓM . By Tychonoff’s Theorem
×i∈N [0, 1]
Ci is compact. Since ×i∈N∆(Ci) is a closed subset of ×i∈N [0, 1]Ci , it is also compact. All
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the remaining steps of the proof of Theorem 5.2 in [Myerson 1991] apply here without change; we omit
the details.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 follows immediately from Lemmas A.1 and A.2.
Theorem 4.2: For all probability measures ν on G, if ν gives positive probability to all games in G, and
K(〈Γ′, I〉∗) = {〈Γ′, h〉 : h ∈ I} for every information set 〈Γ′, I〉∗ of Γν , then (~σ′, µ′) is a generalized
sequential equilibrium of Γ∗ iff (~σ, µ) is a conditional sequential equilibrium of Γν with respect to K,
where σi,Γ′(〈Γh〉 · h′) = σ′i,Γ′(Γh, h′) and µ′Γ′,I = µ〈Γ′,I〉∗ .
Proof: Let Prν~σ be the probability distribution over the histories in Γν induced by the strategy profile
~σ and f νc . For a history h of the game, define Prν~σ(· | h) to be the conditional probability distribution
induced by ~σ and f νc over the possible histories of the game given that the current history is h. Similarly,
let Prh~σ′ be the probability distribution over the histories in Γh ∈ G induced by the generalized strategy
profile ~σ′ and fhc . Note that if Prh~σ′(h′) > 0, then h′ ∈ ⌊Hh⌋. Thus, 〈Γh〉 · h′ ∈ Hν .
For all strategy profiles σ and generalized strategy profiles σ′, if σ′i,Γ′(Γh, h′) = σi,Γ′(〈Γh〉 · h′),
then it is easy to see that for all h′ ∈ Hh such that Prh~σ′(h′) > 0, we have that Prν~σ(〈Γh〉 · h′) =
ν(Γh) Prh~σ′(h
′). And since ν is a probability measure such that ν(Γh) > 0 for all Γh ∈ G, we have that
Prν~σ(〈Γ
h〉 · h′) > 0 iff Prh~σ′(h′) > 0. It is also easy to see that for all h′ 6= 〈 〉 and all h′′ ∈ Hh such that
Prh~σ′(h
′′ | h′) > 0, Prν~σ(〈Γ
h〉 · h′′ | h′) = Prh~σ′(h
′′ | h′).
Suppose that (~σ, µ) is a conditional sequential equilibrium of Γν with respect to K. We first prove
that (~σ′, µ′) satisfies generalized sequential rationality. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that it does
not. Thus, there exists a player i, a generalized i-information set (Γ+, I)∗, and a local strategy s′ for
player i in Γ+ such that
∑
h∈I
∑
z∈Z+
µ′Γ+,I(h)
+
Pr
~σ′
(z | h)u+i (z) <
∑
h∈I
∑
z∈Z+
µ′Γ+,I(h)
+
Pr
(~σ′
−(i,Γ′)
,s′)
(z | h)u+i (z).
Define s to be a strategy for player (i,Γ+) in Γν such that s(〈Γh〉 · h′) = s′(Γh, h′). Using the
observation in the previous paragraph and the fact that µ′Γ+,I = µ〈Γ+,I〉∗ and K(〈Γ
+, I〉∗) = {〈Γ+, h〉 :
h ∈ I}, it follows that ∑
〈Γ+,h〉∈K(〈Γ+,I〉∗)
∑
z∈⌊Z+⌋
µ〈Γ+,I〉∗(h)
ν
Pr
~σ
(〈Γ+〉 · z | h)u+i (z)
<
∑
〈Γ+,h〉∈K(〈Γ+,I〉∗)
∑
z∈⌊Z+⌋
µ〈Γ+,I〉∗(h)
ν
Pr
(~σ
−(i,Γ′),s)
(〈Γ+〉 · z | h)u+i (z).
(1)
By definition of uν
i,Γ+ , u
+
i (z) = u
ν
i,Γ+(〈Γ
+〉, z). Replacing u+i (z) by uνi,Γ+(〈Γ
+〉, z) in (1), it follows
that (~σ, µ) does not satisfy sequential rationality in Γν , a contradiction. So, (~σ′, µ′) satisfies generalized
sequential rationality. It remains to show that µ′ is consistent with ~σ′.
Suppose that, for every generalized information set (Γ+, I)∗,
∑
h∈I Pr
+
~σ′(h) > 0. By definition
of K and the fact that for all h′ ∈ Hν , Prν~σ(〈Γ+〉 · h′) > 0 iff Pr
+
~σ′(h
′) > 0, we have that for every
information set 〈Γ+, I〉∗ of Γν , ∑
〈Γ+,h〉∈K(〈Γ+,I〉∗)
ν
Pr
~σ
(〈Γ+〉 · h) > 0.
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Thus, by consistency of µ, ~σ, and K, it follows that for every information set 〈Γ+, I〉∗ of Γν and every
h ∈ K(〈Γ+, I〉∗), we have
µ〈Γ+,I〉∗(h) =
Prν~σ(〈Γ
+〉 · h)∑
h′∈K(〈Γ+,I〉∗) Pr
ν
~σ(〈Γ
+〉 · h′)
.
Since µ′Γ+,I = µ〈Γ+,I〉∗ , K(〈Γ
′, I〉∗) = {〈Γ′, h〉 : h ∈ I}, and for all h′ ∈ Hh such that Prh~σ′(h′) > 0,
we have that Prν~σ(〈Γh〉 · h′) = ν(Γh) Prh~σ′(h′), it is easy to see that for every generalized information
set (Γ+, I)∗ and every h ∈ I ,
µ′Γ+,I(h) =
Pr+~σ′(h)∑
h′∈I Pr
+
~σ′(h
′)
.
Thus, µ′ is consistent with ~σ′.
Finally, suppose that there exists a generalized information set (Γ+, I)∗ such that
∑
h∈I Pr
+
~σ′(h) =
0. By definition of K and the fact that for all h′ ∈ Hν , Prν~σ(〈Γ+〉 ·h′) > 0 iff Pr
+
~σ′(h
′) > 0, we have that∑
〈Γ+,h〉∈K(〈Γ+,I〉∗) Pr
ν
~σ(〈Γ
+〉 · h) = 0. Thus, by the consistency of µ, ~σ, and K, there exists a sequence
of K-assessments (~σn, µn) such that ~σn consists of completely mixed strategies, µn is consistent with
~σn and K, and (~σn, µn) converges pointwise to (~σ, µ).
Define a sequence of K-assessments (~τn, νn) such that νnΓ′,I = µn〈Γ′,I〉∗ and σ
n
j,Γ′(〈Γ
h〉 · h′) =
τnj,Γ′(Γ
h, h′) for all n. Since ~σn is completely mixed, so is ~τn; it also follows from the earlier argument
that νn is consistent with ~τn for all n. Since (~σn, µn) converges pointwise to (~σ, µ), it is easy to see
that (~τn, νn) converges pointwise to (~σ′, µ′). Thus, µ′ is consistent with ~σ′, and (~σ′, µ′) is a generalized
sequential equilibrium of Γ∗, as desired. The proof of the converse is similar; we leave details to the
reader.
Theorem 4.3: For every extensive game Γ with countably many players where each player has finitely
many pure strategies and for every possibility system K, if (~σ, µ) is a conditional sequential equilibrium
of Γ with respect to K, then there exists a belief system µ′ such that (~σ, µ′) is a sequential equilibrium
of Γ.
Proof: Since (σ, µ) is a conditional sequential equilibrium of Γ with respect to K, by the consistency
of µ, σ, and K, there exists a sequence of K-assessments (σˆk, µˆk) such that σˆk is completely mixed, µˆk
is consistent with σˆk and K, and (σˆk, µˆk) converges pointwise to (σ, µ). Let νˆk be the belief system
consistent with σˆk. Using the same techniques as in the proof of Lemma A.1, we can construct a
subsequence of (σˆk, νˆk) that converges pointwise to (σ, µ′). Thus, µ′ is consistent with σ. It remains to
show that (σ, µ′) satisfies sequential rationality.
Since, by definition of K, for every i-information set I of Γ, player i has the same utility for every
run extending a history in I −K(I), it is not hard to show that
EUi((σ, µ
′) | I) = C + µ′(K(I))EUi((σ, µ) | I),
where C and µ′(K(I)) are independent of σi(I). Since, by sequential rationality, σi(I) is a best re-
sponse given µ, it is also a best response given µ′. It follows that (σ, µ′) is a sequential equilibrium of
Γ, as desired.
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A.2 PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1
Theorem 5.1: If Γ is a standard normal-form game and ~s is a (pure) strategy profile such that for all
i ∈ N , si is a correlated rationalizable strategy of player i in Γ, then
(i) there is a (pure) generalized Nash equilibrium ~s ∗ of Γ∗(~s) such that for every player i, s∗i,Γsi = si;
(ii) for every (pure) generalized Nash equilibrium ~s ∗ of Γ∗(~s), for every local strategy s∗i,Γ′ for every
player i in ~s ∗, the strategy s∗i,Γ′ is correlated rationalizable for player i in Γ.
Proof: Let Γ∗(~s) = (G,Γm,F) be as defined in Section 5. For part (i), consider the generalized strategy
profile ~s ∗ where, for every player i and every Γs′i ∈ Gi, i makes the same move according to both s∗
i,Γ
s′
i
and s′i. Note that, by definition of Γ∗(~s), for all h ∈ Hmi we have that F(Γm, h) = (Γsi , ·). Thus, by
definition of ~s ∗, for every player i, s∗i,Γsi = si. It is easy to check using the definition of Γ∗(~s), that ~s ∗
is a generalized Nash equilibrium, and that, for all i ∈ N , si is a rationalizable strategy for player i; we
leave details to the reader.
For part (ii), let Di = {s∗i,Γ′ : Γ′ ∈ Gi}, i.e., Di consists of the strategies in the underlying game Γ
corresponding to some local strategy of player i in Γ∗(~s). We claim that Di ⊆ B(D−i). To see this, let
s∗i,Γ′ be any local strategy for player i in ~s ∗. Since ~s ∗ is a generalized Nash equilibrium, s∗i,Γ′ is a best
response to the local strategies used by other players in Γ′. Note that, by definition of Di, for every other
player j 6= i, there is a strategy sj,Γ′ ∈ Dj corresponding to the local strategy sj,Γ′ player j follows in
game Γ′. Since, by definition of Γ∗(~s), in game Γ′ nature makes an initial choice and then a copy of Γ
is played, and all players but i know the move made by nature, this initial move by nature can be seen
as a distribution over the local strategies used by the other players in the different copies of Γ contained
in Γ′. Thus, it is easy to see that the strategy si,Γ′ corresponding to s∗i,Γ′ is in B(D−i). Finally, since
s∗i,Γ′ is an arbitrary local strategy of player i in ~s ∗, it follows that Di ⊆ B(D−i). By the definition of
correlated rationalizable strategies, it follows that Di ⊆ Si. Thus, for player i in Γ(~s) and every local
strategy s∗i,Γ′ for i in ~s ∗, s∗i,Γ′ is correlated rationalizable for player i in Γ, as desired.
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